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Health Care Access for Children
with Disabilities
Linda C. Fentiman*
I. Introduction
In the last twenty-five years, we have seen a remarkable
evolution in attitudes and practice toward the treatment of chil-
dren with disabilities.' Children born with severe physical and
mental anomalies are no longer routinely allowed to die. Many
such children, along with those who become disabled later in
childhood through illness or injury, receive aggressive life-sav-
ing medical treatment as well as continuing medical and
habilitative care. Some children, particularly those whose fami-
lies are affluent, receive substantial therapeutic and other sup-
portive services that permit them to overcome their disabilities
and function effectively in school and, later, at work.2
* Linda C. Fentiman is Professor of Law and Director of the Health Law and
Policy Program at Pace University School of Law. She holds a B.S. from Cornell
University, J.D. from S.U.N.Y. Buffalo Law School, and LL.M. from Harvard Uni-
versity School of Law.
The author is grateful to her colleague Josh Greenburg for his helpful advice
and comments. She is also thankful for the dedicated research assistance she re-
ceived from two Pace University Law School students, Marleen Kelley, Class of
1999, and Lloyd Cohen, Class of 2000.
1. Studies indicate that nearly 7% of all American children have some form of
mental or physical disability, including physical disabilities like cerebral palsy,
chronic illnesses like AIDS, birth defects like spina bifada, cognitive disorders like
mental retardation, behavioral disorders like autism and attention deficit hyperac-
tivity disorder, and mental illnesses like schizophrenia. See Dorothy K. Doolittle,
Welfare Reform: Loss of Supplemental Security Income SSI for Children with Disa-
bilities, 3 J. OF THE SOC'Y OF PEDIATRIC NURSEs 33 (Jan. 12, 1998).
2. Schools are also becoming more adept at integrating disabled children into
the classroom and providing supportive services for them, acting under the man-
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Even though the approaches to treatment of disabled chil-
dren have changed significantly during the last quarter cen-
tury, the fundamental legal, ethical, and resource allocation
issues remain constant. These are the complex and intertwined
issues of authority, autonomy, and advocacy. Authority is the
legal and moral power of parents, physicians, and the govern-
ment to make decisions about disabled children's access to
health care. Autonomy involves the practical ability of parents,
physicians, and others, to make such decisions alone, free from
outside interference. Advocacy, of course, is giving voice to a
particular child, or a group of disabled children, who seek access
to high quality health care.
Problems of access arise in two major contexts: access to
acute medical treatment, including urgent and emergent care,
and access to continuing medical, habilitative and supportive
services. The paradigmatic acute care cases are those involving
severely disabled newborns - Baby Doe in Indiana, 3 Baby Jane
Doe in the University Hospital case,4 Baby "K" in Virginia,5 and
Baby Terry in Michigan. 6 In these cases, the primary focus of
analysis has been on parents' capacity and power to make ap-
propriate health care decisions for their children, when their
authority to do so has been challenged by physicians, hospitals,
or the government. Other notable cases have arisen when chil-
dates of the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1491 (1996), and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et
seq. (1998). Detailed exploration of this subject is beyond the scope of this article.
However, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari
in Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garrett, 106 F.3d 822 (8th Cir.
1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998), a case holding that the IDEA requires
school districts to pay for full-time nursing services at school which are "required
to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education." Id. at 824
(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1996)).
3. See JEFF LYON, PLAYING GOD IN THE NURSERY 21-58 (1985).
4. United States v. Univ. Hosp., State Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, 729
F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
5. In the Matter of Baby "K," 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), affg and modifying
In the Matter of Baby "K," 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993).
6. In re Achtabowski, No. G93-142173-GD (Mich. P.Ct. July 30, 1993), No. 93-
1247-AV (Mich. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 1993), leave to appeal denied, 548 N.W.2d 628
(Mich. 1995), discussed in James Bopp Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Child Abuse by
Whom? Parental Rights and Judicial Competency Determinations: The Baby K and
Baby Terry Cases, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 821, 825 (1994).
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dren become candidates for aggressive medical care, and their
parents do not want to pursue it. v
The second cluster of cases involves access to care on a con-
tinuing or chronic basis: gaining access to appropriate medical
specialty care and appropriate habilitation services, and inte-
grating medical and other services in order to maximize a
child's opportunities for effective functioning. Chronic disabil-
ity cases are much more numerous than the headline-grabbing
acute care cases, and usually do not involve dramatic "life and
death" decisions. Instead, disputes usually raise two types of
issues: (1) whether services are related to a medical condition,
and thus are medically necessary, and (2) whether a child's disa-
bilities are sufficiently severe to meet government criteria for
financial assistance.8
Eligibility for federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI)9
benefits for poor, disabled children is particularly valuable be-
cause it guarantees its recipients access to Medicaid, the fed-
eral-state partnership that pays for medical services for certain
categories of low income individuals. 10 In addition, SSI pro-
vides a cash benefit to families of disabled children, which is
critical in permitting poor families to buy necessary supportive
products and services, such as state of the art wheelchairs, nu-
tritional supplements, and other items not covered by Medicaid.
The cash benefit also allows parents of disabled children to
purchase child care services that permit them to work more
7. See, e.g., In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765 (Wash. 1942) (holding that there was
no basis for overruling parental refusal to consent to medically recommended am-
putation of deformed arm, absent demonstration that parent was unfit to make
decision); In re Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d 836 (Mass. 1979) (finding that
three year old child suffering from leukemia was in need of state care and protec-
tion where, against medical advice, his parents discontinued chemotherapy and
substituted treatment with laetrile); Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal.
1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989) (holding that mother could be prosecuted
for involuntary manslaughter and felony child endangerment after she treated her
child with prayer rather than Western medicine, despite a faith healing exemption
in the misdemeanor child neglect statute).
8. See, e.g., Nelson v. Apfel, 131 F.3d 1228 (7th Cir. 1997).
9. The Supplemental Security Income Program guarantees minimal cash
assistance and access to medical care to disabled adults and children. See 42
U.S.C. § 1381 et seq.
10. See Overview of the Medicare and Medicaid Programs: Medicare and
Medicaid Statistical Supplement, 1997, 18 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 1 (1997), avail-
able in 1997 WL 18242940.
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hours, and thus, try to bring the family out of poverty." By
1995, nearly one million poor American children received cash
assistance through the SSI program because they were dis-
abled. 12 This number has been drastically reduced since Con-
gress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.13 As part of a broad
overhaul of American social welfare law, this Act altered both
the criteria and the process for determining eligibility for SSI
benefits due to childhood disability, excluding many children
with moderate disabilities from the SSI program, particularly if
their disabilities were behavioral or emotional. 14 Exclusion also
threatened to deny these children benefits under the Medicaid
Act,15 but Congress reversed itself in the Balanced Budget Act
of 1997,16 which restored Medicaid eligibility for disabled chil-
dren who had been cut from SSI by the 1996 law. 17
Disability cases also shine a spotlight on the medical versus
habilitative distinction that pervades the United States health
care system, which generally provides and pays for care within
the framework of the medical model. The medical model is
predicated on treatment for an injury or illness, designed to
lead to restoration and recovery to a previously existing "nor-
mal" status. In contrast, the disabilities model is organized
around a child's "condition," for which treatment and services
are provided focusing on developmental progression and attain-
ment. Medical necessity disputes arise out of the health care
reimbursement system's historical reliance on physicians as
gatekeepers, who, in this role, designate patients as ill or in-
jured and in need of acute or chronic health care. This focus on
medically oriented definitions of impairment frequently leads to
the drawing of arbitrary distinctions between "medical" care,
11. See Adam Piori, Losing a Lifeline: Disability Cutbacks Imperil Children's
Health, BERGEN CoUNTY RECORD, Feb. 15, 1998, at Al.
12. See Lenna Kennedy, SSA Programs that Benefit Children (Social Security
Administration), 59 Soc. SEC. BULL. 64 (Sept. 1996), available in 1996 WL
11547698; see also Doolittle, supra note 1, at 38.
13. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
14. See id. § 211.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a et seq. (1998).
16. Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
17. See Doolittle, supra note 1, at 40; see also Balanced Budget Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997).
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which is covered by a government or private payor, and
"habilitative" or "custodial" care, which is not.'8 Disputes about
eligibility for government payment for habilitative and other
services for disabled children are often an outgrowth of this
medically based approach to providing services. They also re-
flect a profound lack of understanding of, and skepticism about,
the nature of disabilities, particularly where children are
concerned.
II. Autonomy, Authority, and Advocacy
What links these two groups of children's access cases are
the concepts of autonomy, authority, and advocacy. The auton-
omy principle raises the question: Under what circumstances
should parents be left alone, free from interference from health
care professionals, the government, and third-party payors, to
make decisions about what treatment is most appropriate for
their child? For most lawyers, and many parents, autonomy is
the preeminent principle, trumping all other considerations.
The authority principle asks: Who is legally authorized to
make decisions on behalf of a disabled child, and under what
circumstances should it be someone other than the child's par-
ents - the government, physicians, or other health care provid-
ers - who has the final say? Authority issues arise in a wide
range of circumstances, including decisions about proposed
medical treatments, 19 and access to habilitative services and
other resources necessary to maximize a disabled child's
functioning.
The concept of advocacy cuts across the principles of auton-
omy and authority. Here we are asking: Who speaks for the
18. See, e.g., RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH
CARE SYSTEM 1151 (1997) (discussing long term care).
19. These cases raise not only the question of what medical treatment is nec-
essary, but where it should be provided, and who should pay for it. See, e.g., In re
Baby "K," 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), affg and modifying In re Baby "K," 832 F.
Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993) (upholding the right of a mother of an anencephalic
baby to insist that it receive life-saving respirator treatment when brought to a
hospital emergency room); Parham v. J.R, 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (upholding parents'
rights to commit their mentally ill children to a state mental hospital without judi-
cial review of the commitment decision); Detsel v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.
1990) (holding that Medicaid must pay for skilled nursing care necessary to permit
a severely disabled child to attend public school).
1999] 249
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child - the parents or other legal representative, health care
professionals, or the government, either individually or in
combination?
III. Access to Acute Care
A review of acute care treatment decisions for disabled chil-
dren shows a remarkable swing of the pendulum in the last
twenty-five years. Treatment has moved from deliberate non-
action, to aggressive medical intervention, to a more recent re-
examination of the appropriateness of deploying high technol-
ogy solutions in all cases.
In 1973, Raymond Duff and A.G.M. Campbell launched a
firestorm of controversy with an article that acknowledged pub-
licly what was commonly known among pediatricians: that in
some cases, physicians and families considered it appropriate,
and indeed superior, to withdraw or withhold medical treat-
ment from disabled newborns, rather than insisting on aggres-
sive treatment which would likely be painful, might ultimately
prove futile, and would in any case permit a child to live who
was expected to have a very poor quality of life.20 In 1979, Rob-
ert and Peggy Stinson published an agonizing account of the
tragic life of their extremely premature son, which vividly
dramatized the consequences of denigration of parental auton-
omy and authority and its replacement with untrammeled phy-
sician authority and a commitment to pushing the outside of
the envelope. 21 The Stinson's son, "Baby Andrew," was treated
over their objections in a neonatal intensive care unit for six
months, until physicians finally decided that his case was in-
deed hopeless, and permitted him to die.22
IV. The "Baby Doe" Cases
"Baby Doe" was a highly publicized case which made visible
the conflict between parents who sought to make a "quality of
20. See Raymond Duff & A.G.M. Campbell, Moral and Ethical Issues in the
Special Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973), reprinted in JUDITH
AREEN ET AL., LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 1169 (1984).
21. See Robert Stinson & Peggy Stinson, On the Death of a Baby, 244 THE
ATLANTIC 64 (July 1979); see also ROBERT STINSON & PEGGY STINSON, THE LONG
DYING OF BABY ANDREW (1983).
22. See id.
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life" decision for their disabled child and a physician who tried
to insist on aggressive medical intervention. 23 "Baby Doe" was
born in Bloomington, Indiana, in 1982 suffering from Down
Syndrome (a condition that always involves mild to severe
mental retardation), apparent circulatory and neurological im-
pairments, and esophageal atresia (a gap between the esopha-
gus and stomach that prevents ingested food from reaching the
stomach).24 If the esophageal atresia was not surgically cor-
rected, the baby would have starved to death.25 The parents de-
cided, after consulting with their obstetrician and pediatrician,
that their child would have such a poor quality of life due to
Down Syndrome and his other disabilities, that it would be
wrong for him, his parents, and his older siblings to agree to the
necessary surgery. 26 The parents' decision was challenged by
another pediatrician and the local prosecutor, but the parents'
right to decide what was best for their child, given conflicting
medical opinions, was upheld first by a lower court, and then by
the Indiana Supreme Court. 27 Baby Doe died six days after
birth.28
The enormous publicity surrounding this case caused an
outcry by disability rights and "right to life" advocates. In 1983,
in response to this case, the "Baby Doe" regulations were
promulgated on an "interim final" basis by the Reagan Adminis-
tration, under the authority of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.29 These regulations prohibited hospitals from discrimi-
nating on the basis of a handicap in providing medical treat-
ment to seriously ill newborns (i.e., not treating children with
disabilities when they would have treated a non-disabled
child). 30 The regulations focused primarily on the process by
which potential cases of medical neglect should be handled by
state child abuse authorities, but they also significantly ex-
panded the federal government's role in overseeing and investi-
gating medical treatment decisions for severely disabled
23. See LYON, supra note 3, at 24-25.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See LYON, supra note 3, at 28-38.
29. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, App. C. (1998).
30. See id.
1999] 251
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newborns. 31 The regulations established a "Handicapped Infant
Hotline," and required hospitals receiving federal funds to post
signs in all infant care settings, warning "Discriminatory Fail-
ure to Feed and Care for Handicapped Infants in this Facility is
Prohibited by Federal Law."32 So called "Baby Doe Squads"
would descend upon hospitals where discriminatory denial of
treatment was suspected, often based upon the report of a nurse
or relative of a seriously ill newborn, and launch an inquiry into
the child's case.33 On occasion, the federal investigative process
worked so quickly that federal authorities arrived at a hospital
even before a treatment decision had been made. 34
Ultimately, the "Baby Doe" regulations were struck down
as having exceeded the Congressional grant of authority in
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 35 The regulations were
first invalidated in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler,36
in which the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia
agreed with a facial challenge to the hastily published regula-
tions, and held that the regulations were adopted in violation of
the Administrative Procedure Act. 37
In 1984, in United States v. University Hospital,38 the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Rehabilitation Act
did not authorize the government to compel access to the Medi-
caid records of a handicapped infant.39 This case involved the
federal government's attempt to intervene in the medical deci-
sion-making process in the case of a particular child, Baby Jane
Doe, who was born with multiple congenital anomalies, includ-
31. See id.
32. Id. at 9631. In pertinent part, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 pro-
vides that, "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual.., shall, solely by rea-
son of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving fed-
eral financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
33. See LYON, supra note 3, at 42-43; see also United States v. Univ. Hospital,
State Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
34. See Bowen v. The Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 635-636 (1986).
35. See Am. Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983)
(citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 et seq. (1996)).
36. 561 F. Supp. 395.
37. See id. at 400-03.
38. 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
39. Id. at 160-61.
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ing spina bifada,40 microcephaly, 41 and hydrocephalus. 42 Be-
cause of these conditions, it was expected that she would be
mentally retarded, and might have a short life.43 After consult-
ing with physicians at University Hospital in Stony Brook, New
York, the parents elected to forego surgery to correct the spina
bifada and hydrocephalus, and instead chose to undertake more
conservative, comfort-based treatment, which was less likely to
prolong her life.44
The University Hospital case was widely publicized when a
Vermont attorney, who was unknown to the family, initiated an
action in New York State court to compel the hospital to under-
take the more aggressive course of treatment. 45 Although he
succeeded at the trial court level, that decision was reversed on
appeal. 46 The New York Court of Appeals held that an unre-
lated person had no authority to seek judicial intervention in a
private medical decision. 47
Concurrently, the United States Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) sought to review Baby Jane Doe's medi-
cal records, in order to determine if the decision to pursue less
aggressive medical care violated the "Baby Doe" regulations,
48
and thus, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.49 When the hospital
refused the HHS request, the United States brought suit in the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
The district court found that University Hospital had not
discriminatorily failed to treat Baby Jane Doe, because it was
the parents, and not the hospital, who decided not to conduct
the surgery. 50 Furthermore, the court emphasized the reasona-
40. Spina bifida is a "congenital defect in which part of the meninges or spinal
cord protrudes through the spinal column, often resulting in neurological impair-
ment." RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1838 (1993).
41. Mircrocephaly is a condition in which the child's skull is unusually small.
See id. at 1214.
42. Hydrocephalus is an accumulation of fluid within the skull which often
causes great enlargement of the head. See id. at 937.
43. See Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d at 146.
44. See id.
45. See Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469
N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983).
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See University Hospital, 729 F.2d at 147-48.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
50. See Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d at 149.
1999] 253
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bleness of the parents' decision in light of "'due consideration of
the medical options available and on a genuine concern for the
best interests of the child."' 51 On appeal, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was
never intended to involve the federal government in medical
treatment decisions for seriously ill newborns. 52
The case of Bowen v. The American Hospital Association5 3
involved a facial challenge to the "Baby Doe" regulations. 54 In
Bowen, a plurality of the Supreme Court agreed with the Sec-
ond Circuit's view that the "Baby Doe" regulations were
promulgated in excess of the authority granted by § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.55 The Supreme Court reviewed the history
of the "Baby Doe" regulations, and found no evidence that hos-
pitals were discriminating against disabled newborns by with-
holding treatment, because whenever treatment was not
provided, it was because the parents had not consented. 56 The
Supreme Court concluded that there was no basis for the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services' decision to invoke § 504's
prohibition against federally funded facilities discriminating on
the basis of handicap.57 Instead, the Court found that state
child abuse agencies were providing ample protection against
the medical neglect of disabled newborns and had intervened to
seek judicial authorization of medical treatment when
necessary. 58
What are the lessons of the Baby Doe cases? An initial ex-
amination of these cases reveals that the courts affirmed the
ability of parents to decide what was appropriate medical care
for their children, so long as the parents had consulted with
medical professionals, and had gained some medical support for
their decision. These decisions, from Baby Doe in Bloomington,
Indiana, to Baby Jane Doe in Stony Brook, New York, to
Bowen's invalidation of the "Baby Doe" regulations in their en-
51. Id. (quoting United States v. Univ. Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 615 (E.D.N.Y.
1983)).
52. See id. at 161.
53. 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
54. See id. at 613.
55. See id. at 647.
56. See id. at 610.
57. See id. at 646.
58. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 639.
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tirety, can be seen as affirming parental autonomy and author-
ity. The decisions also uphold the authority of physicians and
other health care providers to guide parents through difficult
health care decisions, free from outside interference. The gov-
ernment was permitted to intervene only in extreme cases of
medical neglect and child abuse (where, presumably, physicians
disagreed with parents about the appropriate treatment ap-
proach), and then it was the state, not federal government that
was held to have authority to second guess the parents'
decision.
On a deeper level, however, the apparent recognition of pa-
rental autonomy and authority in the Baby Doe cases may be
illusory. In reality, only in cases where the doctors agreed with
the parents were the parents' choices affirmed. 59 In other cases,
where the physicians believed that treatment should be given,
the parents' authority was overruled, and they were either ig-
nored, as were the Stinsons in the case of Baby Andrew, 60 or
reported to state child abuse authorities as noted in Bowen.61
Thus, in truth, the Baby Doe decisions vindicated physician, not
parental autonomy and authority.
V. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption
Reform Act
Even as challenges to the "Baby Doe" regulations were
wending their way through the federal courts, Congress was
acting to provide the authority for federal involvement in medi-
cal decision-making for seriously ill newborns which was al-
leged to be lacking in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. As part of
a broad concern with child abuse and adoption and the lack of
adequate resources to investigate and prosecute cases of abuse,
Congress sought to ensure that uniform federal standards
would be used in cases of medical neglect. Congress offered a
carrot-and-stick approach: a promise to supply more financial
resources to state child abuse programs if states would adopt
sweeping definitions of medical neglect, which were directly fo-
cused at disabled newborns. Under the 1984 amendments to
59. See, e.g., LYON, supra note 3, at 21-58; United States v. Univ. Hosp., 729
F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
60. See sources cited supra note 21.
61. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 635.
1999] 255
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the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Re-
form Act ("the Child Abuse Prevention Act"), 62 and the regula-
tions promulgated under it in 1985,63 "medical neglect" was
defined as:
The withholding of medically indicated treatment unless:
i) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose;
ii) the provision of such services would merely prolong dying and
not be effective in ameliorating all of the infant's life threatening
conditions, or otherwise be futile in the survival of the infant; or
iii) the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in
terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under
such circumstances would be inhumane. 64
The regulations further mandated that nutrition, hydra-
tion, and medication always be provided. 65 This directly ad-
dressed the situation frequently at issue in the Baby Doe cases,
where the medical treatment involved the provision of correc-
tive surgery to permit nutrition and hydration, and a decision
not to treat often included the withholding of food and fluids.
The Child Abuse Prevention Act was a delicately crafted polit-
ical compromise. It involved negotiations among representa-
tives of the American Academy of Pediatrics, right to life and
disability advocacy groups, and HHS, who sought to identify
common ground on which there was agreement that no medical
treatment should be provided.
The common ground, however, was extremely sparse, and
the inherent ambiguity and subjectivity in such terms as
"merely prolong dying," "futile," and "inhumane" have had a sig-
nificant impact on the practice of medicine in hospital delivery
rooms and neonatal intensive care units. Several studies have
indicated that in the wake of the "Baby Doe" regulations and
the 1985 Child Abuse regulations, physicians and other health
care professionals have become much more aggressive in their
treatment of extremely premature, low birth weight infants, or
other infants born with severe and multiple anomalies, fearing
62. Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984).
63. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1340.1 - 1340.20 (1998).
64. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(2).
65. See id.
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that to do otherwise would provoke federal or state
intervention.66
Thus, Congress succeeded where HHS did not, in imposing
federal substantive standards for the medical treatment of chil-
dren born with severe disabilities. 67 These standards froze
medical standards in the mid-1980's, unable to evolve with
medical and scientific advances in the last fifteen years. They
also directly limit physician autonomy and authority to make
medical treatment decisions for seriously ill newborns, and indi-
rectly constrain parental autonomy and authority as well, by
limiting the options that physicians can provide to parents in
discussing their child's condition and prognosis.
VI. Baby K and Baby Terry
In two cases in the 1990's, courts have again been called
upon to decide whether parents or physicians have the author-
ity to decide the course of a disabled child's medical treatment.
The results have been inconsistent. In one case, courts upheld
the right of a mother of a severely disabled infant to insist on
medical treatment, while in the other, courts found that parents
who insisted on treatment over the objections of the baby's doc-
tors were incompetent to make medical treatment decisions. In
In re Baby "K,"68 two federal courts addressed the question of
whether the mother of an anencephalic child could insist on
medical treatment that a hospital's physicians believed to be fu-
tile, and therefore inappropriate. 69 After Baby "K" was born,
she was diagnosed as anencephalic (lacking major portions of
her brain, skull, and scalp, and as a result, permanently uncon-
scious).7 0 Believing that she would soon die, hospital physicians
recommended that Baby "K" be provided only comfort care: nu-
trition, hydration, and warmth, but urged that she not be
66. See L.M. Kopelman et al., Neonatologists Judge the "Baby Doe" Regula-
tions, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 677, 683 (1988); J.J. Pomerance & T.C. Yu et al.,
Changing Attitudes of Neonatologists Toward Ventilator Support, 8 J. PER-
INATOLOGY 232, 237 (1988); cf. JEANNE GUILLEMIN & LYNDA HOLMSTROM, MIXED
BLESSINGS: INTENSIVE CARE FOR NEWBORNS 281-82 (1982).
67. See 45 C.F.R. 1340.1 - 1340.20.
68. 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), affg and modifying In re Baby "K," 832 F.
Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993).
69. See id. at 590.
70. See id. at 592.
1999]
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placed on a respirator if she began to experience difficulty in
breathing, which was a normal outgrowth of her anencephalic
condition. 71 Baby "K"'s mother rejected the physicians' propo-
sal, and refused to agree to a "Do Not Resuscitate Order."72 In-
stead, she insisted that Baby "K" receive mechanical
respiratory support when necessary. 73
As a result of this impasse, the hospital sought to transfer
Baby "K" to another hospital with a pediatric intensive care
unit, but none was willing to accept her.7 4 However, Baby "K"
progressed, miraculously, to the point that she no longer needed
acute hospital care, and she was moved to a nursing home.75
Thereafter, she occasionally suffered severe respiratory distress
necessitating mechanical respiratory support, which the nurs-
ing home could not provide. 76 Baby "K" would then be brought
to the original hospital's emergency room, where her mother
would request respiratory support to stabilize her breathing,
which was provided under protest. 77
After Baby "K"s second emergency room visit, the hospital
brought suit in the Federal District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia, seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not
obligated, under Virginia or federal law, to provide treatment
that it believed to be futile and therefore ethically inappropri-
ate.78 The district court ruled in favor of the mother, concluding
that under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 79 the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA),0 and the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA),81 the hospital was
compelled to furnish care to Baby "K."82
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the district court, but relied solely on EMTALA for its deci-
71. See id. at 592-93.
72. See id. at 593.
73. See Baby "K," 16 F.3d at 593.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See Baby "K," 16 F.3d at 593.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1998).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1998).
82. See Baby "K," 16 F.3d at 592.
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sion.8 3 Thus, the court was able to avoid two trickier questions:
1) whether under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, an
anencephalic child was "otherwise qualified" despite her
anencephaly to receive medical treatment from a federally sup-
ported hospital, and 2) whether such a child was being discrimi-
nated against because of her disability, in violation of the ADA,
when the hospital refused to provide respiratory support, which
would have been provided to a non-anencephalic child who was
having difficulty breathing.
The court construed EMTALA in what it deemed a
"straightforward" manner, holding that EMTALA reflected a
Congressional mandate that all persons who presented them-
selves at hospital emergency rooms with a potential emergency
health condition be given an appropriate medical screening ex-
amination to determine if a medical emergency existed, and re-
ceive appropriate stabilizing treatment before admission to the
hospital or transfer to another institution for appropriate care.8 4
Under this view of EMTALA, once Baby "K" arrived at the hos-
pital in respiratory distress, the hospital had no alternative but
to examine her and provide stabilizing treatment for her
breathing difficulties. The court found that EMTALA pre-
empted all state law to the contrary, including medical malprac-
tice and professional ethics laws.8 5
In his dissent, Judge Sprouse expressly voiced concern that
federal involvement in individual medical treatment decisions
was inappropriate,8 6 sounding remarkably like Justice Stevens'
plurality opinion in Bowen v. The American Hospital Associa-
tion.8 7 Judge Sprouse voiced disbelief "that Congress, in enact-
ing EMTALA, meant for the judiciary to superintend the
sensitive decision-making process between family and physi-
cians at the bedside of a helpless and terminally ill patient."88
He observed, "[tiragic end-of-life hospital dramas such as this
one do not represent phenomena susceptible of uniform legal
control .... Congress, even in its weakest moments, would not
83. See id.
84. See id. at 594-95.
85. See id. at 597.
86. See Baby "K," 16 F.3d at 598 (Sprouse, S.J., dissenting).
87. 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
88. Baby "K," 16 F.3d at 598 (Sprouse, S.J., dissenting).
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have attempted to impose federal control in this sensitive, pri-
vate area."8 9
At first glance, In re Baby "K'90 appears to be a victory for
parents, and a defeat for physicians and other health care prov-
iders, because the court held that a parent can insist on provi-
sion of medical care for a disabled child, even if physicians do
not wish to provide it. However, other Fourth Circuit EMTALA
decisions make clear the limited nature of this holding because
seriously disabled newborns rarely receive treatment in an
emergency room, 91 and because EMTALA demands treatment
only when a physician actually determines that a patient is in
the midst of medical emergency. 92 In Baber v. Hospital Corpo-
ration of America,93 the Fourth Circuit declined to find a viola-
tion of EMTALA when an emergency room physician refused to
perform an x-ray or other radiological procedure for an emer-
gency room patient who hit her head when she fell in the emer-
gency room, despite her brother's repeated requests. 94 The
patient subsequently died due to an undiagnosed brain injury.95
Determining that the physician had no reason to believe that
the patient had suffered a serious injury, nor that there was a
medical emergency, the court found that EMTALA's emergency
screening requirement was not triggered, and thus EMTALA
had not been violated. 96
In Bryan v. The Rectors and Visitors of the University of
Virginia,97 the court held that the duty imposed by EMTALA, to
stabilize and provide appropriate medical care, did not extend
beyond the emergency room.98 In a situation akin to that of
Baby "K," but at the other end of life, physicians who had pro-
vided respiratory support to an elderly patient upon her admis-
sion to the hospital from its emergency room, declined to
89. Id.
90. Id. at 590.
91. See, e.g., Bryan v. The Rectors and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 95
F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that EMTALA did not impose a continuing
duty to treat after the patient was admitted to the hospital).
92. See Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992).
93. Id.
94. See id. at 874.
95. See id. at 875.
96. See id. at 885.
97. 95 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 1996).
98. See id. at 349.
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continue that support when they concluded that further treat-
ment would be futile, despite the family's wishes to the con-
trary.99 The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that
EMTALA imposed a continuing duty to provide medical care
whenever a patient's life was at stake, and declared instead
that EMTALA's focus was limited to the emergency room.l 0
Thus, the significance of In re Baby "K" appears to be quite
limited. In re Baby "K' should not be considered a ringing en-
dorsement of parental rights to insist on treatment of handi-
capped children. Rather, it reflects the limited, patchwork
nature of federal regulation of medical treatment decisions, and
the isolated and sometimes arbitrary impact of federal laws on
physician autonomy in making treatment decisions.
The case of Baby Terry'0 ' provides a strikingly different
view of parental autonomy in making medical decisions for seri-
ously ill newborns. Baby Terry was born in Michigan in 1993 at
twenty-three weeks gestational age, suffering from respiratory
distress and a number of other complications that frequently ac-
company extreme prematurity.'0 2 He was placed on a respira-
tor to assist him in breathing, but defied his physicians'
predictions that he would soon die. 0 3 Because his physicians
believed that the respirator treatment was merely prolonging
death, and did not provide a meaningful chance to recover from
his many illnesses, they tried to persuade his parents to discon-
tinue the respirator.'0 4
After the parents refused to stop treatment, the Genesee
County Department of Social Services sought a judicial declara-
tion that the parents were incompetent decision-makers and
that another person should be substituted as Terry's guard-
ian.10 5 Ultimately, the Genesee County Probate Court declared
99. See id. at 350.
100. See id. at 353.
101. The facts of Baby Terry's case are taken from the Appellant's Brief, In re
Achtabowski, No. 93-1247-AV (Mich. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 1993), cited in James Bopp
Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Child Abuse by Whom? Parental Rights and Judicial
Competency Determinations: The Baby K and Baby Terry Cases, 20 Ohio N.U. L.
REV. 821, 825 (1994). The author was unable to independently verify these facts
either through a court opinion or trial transcripts.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 826, 828.
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the parents to be specifically incompetent to make medical
treatment decisions for Baby Terry. 10 6 Although no psychologi-
cal or psychiatric evaluation of the parents was conducted, the
court apparently believed that because the parents refused to
accept the doctors' grim prognosis for their son, their judgment
was so impaired that they could not be considered competent
decision-makers. The court appointed another relative as Baby
Terry's guardian. 10 7 The guardian declared that it was in Baby
Terry's best interest to withdraw the respiratory treatment,
and let him die. 08
Baby Terry is a troubling example of judicial and physician
usurpation of parental authority to make decisions about the
medical treatment of their children. In this case, the Genesee
County Probate Court totally ignored the usual presumption
that parents act in their children's best interest,10 9 which re-
quires judicial deference, unless the parents' decision is clearly
erroneous. 110 In failing to distinguish between the question of
competency (capacity) to make a decision and the merits of that
decision, the probate court overlooked the presumption that
parents are the most appropriate decision-makers for their
child,"' and exalted physician judgment to a pinnacle from
which it could not be overthrown. At the very least, procedural
due process demands both that a decision to supersede parental
authority be based upon a thorough examination of the parents'
psychiatric and psychological functioning and that other medi-
cal opinions on the appropriateness of continuing medical treat-
ment for a particular child be presented. Further, because of
the irrevocable nature of the probate court's decision to effec-
tively terminate parental rights and select a guardian whose
sole function would be to declare that it was in Baby Terry's
106. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 101, at 826.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 827. After Baby Terry's death, his mother sought review in the
Michigan Supreme Court, asserting that this was a classic case capable of repeti-
tion but evading review. See id. The court declined to accept review. See In re
Achtabowski, 548 N.W.2d 628 (Mich. 1995).
109. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584 (1979).
110. See Parhan v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979).
111. See id.
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interest to die, it was incumbent upon the court to stay its deci-
sion to provide the opportunity for appellate review.
Baby Terry is clearly aberrational when compared with
most other cases in which parental authority to make difficult
medical decisions for their children has been challenged. It is
significant that in the Baby Doe and University Hospital cases,
the parents' judgment was supported by at least some physi-
cians, so that reviewing courts could find the parents' decision
to be reasonable and decide that federal courts should stay out
of this type of medical decision-making. 112 In contrast, in Baby
Terry and Baby Andrew, the parents' views were rejected by all
of the physicians involved. 113 In each of these cases, the par-
ents, who, ironically, were at opposite ends of the pro- and anti-
treatment spectrum, were powerless to have their treatment de-
cisions respected and implemented. 14 Baby "K" appears to be
unique because even though her mother stood alone in her opin-
ion that continuing medical treatment was appropriate, Baby
"K" happened to need that treatment in a situation in which
EMTALA provided essential protection. These cases suggest
that our laws provide insufficient support for parental auton-
omy and authority in making medical decisions on behalf of
their disabled children. The general rule under our federal and
state laws, as applied in the last twenty years, is that parents
are permitted the autonomy and authority to act on behalf of
their children only when they can find a physician who supports
their decision, a physician who is in turn constrained by the au-
thority of the federal government as embodied in the Child
Abuse Regulations. 1 5 Thus, in reality, American law and
American courts actually denigrate parental autonomy and au-
thority in favor of medical and governmental authority.
VII. Access to Chronic or Outpatient Care
In addition to receiving acute health care, usually in the
hospital setting, children with disabilities frequently face obsta-
cles in obtaining continuing care, particularly in the least re-
112. See LYON, supra note 3, at 32, 35; United States v. Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d
144, 146 (2d Cir. 1984).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22, 101-108.
114. See id.
115. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.1 - 1340.20.
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strictive setting possible. Four recent cases may change this:
two interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act 16 and two
reviewing challenges to regulations promulgated under the
Medicaid Act. 117 The ADA was enacted to expand the reach of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, in order to more fully integrate
disabled Americans into the mainstream of social and economic
life.118 Title II of the ADA imposes a prohibition against dis-
crimination on the basis of disability on all arms of state gov-
ernment, including state funded programs for health
services. 19 Title III of the ADA imposes a requirement of non-
discrimination on all places of public accommodation, including
hospitals and physicians' offices. 120
In Helen L. v. DiDario,12' the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the ADA required the Pennsylvania Department
of Public Welfare to provide supportive services to a disabled
woman in a non-institutionalized setting.' 22 The plaintiff, Idell
S., was a forty-three-year-old woman who was paralyzed from
the waist down. 23 She required some assistance with the activ-
ities of daily living, and was eligible for assistance from the De-
partment of Public Welfare because she was indigent. 124 The
Department provided such services in two programs: a nursing
home residence program, funded through Medicaid at an an-
nual cost of $45,000, and an attendant care program, which pro-
vided the same services to people in their own homes, at an
annual cost of $10,500.125 Due to the way the Pennsylvania leg-
islature had organized and funded these two programs, there
was space for Ms. S. only in the more expensive nursing home
program. 126 In the nursing home, Ms. S. was surrounded by dis-
116. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46
F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995). Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
(1998).
117. See Detsel v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1990); Skubel v. Fuoroli, 113
F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 1997). Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a et seq. (1998).
118. See Helen L., 46 F.3d at 331 (citing S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 20 (1989), H.R. REP. No. 485 II, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1990)).
119. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 (1997).
120. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 - 12189 (1995).
121. 46 F.3d 325.
122. See id. at 325.
123. See id. at 328.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 329.
126. See Helen L., 46 F.3d at 329.
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abled individuals, isolated from friends in the community, and
unable to care for her two adolescent children. 127 She sued the
Department of Public Welfare, arguing that its failure to pro-
vide the services for which she was eligible in the less restric-
tive setting of her home violated the ADA, because it prevented
her from being integrated into the mainstream of society to the
fullest extent possible. 128
The Third Circuit agreed, ruling that "the unnecessary seg-
regation of individuals with disabilities in the provision of pub-
lic services is itself a form of discrimination within the meaning
of" the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 29 The court
further held that under these statutes, "a public entity shall
make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or proce-
dures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimina-
tion on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can
demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamen-
tally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity." 30 In
this case, the court found that it was entirely reasonable for the
Department of Public Welfare to modify its programs for per-
sons with disabilities who needed assistance with the activities
of daily living to provide more spaces in its attendant care pro-
gram.'3' Since the program's avowed goal was to "enable
[adults]... to live in their own homes and communities," requir-
ing the Department to provide health care services for addi-
tional people would not alter the fundamental nature of the
program, and it would cost less to enroll more people like Ms.
Idell S. in the attendant care program. 32
The reasoning of Helen L. v. DiDario,33 if widely ac-
cepted, 34 would have far-reaching implications for the provi-
sion of services for disabled children. No longer could states
and the federal government, the primary payors for services for
127. See id. at 329.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 33.
130. Id. at 336-37 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)).
131. See Helen L. 46 F.3d at 337.
132. Id. at 337-38.
133. 46 F.3d 325.
134. The wide reach of Title II of the ADA was recently recognized by the
Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. 1952
(1998) (holding, on appeal from the Third Circuit, that Title II of the ADA applies
to a state's department of corrections).
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disabled children, insist that the price for receiving a broad
package of services is living in an institution. Instead, author-
ity to decide where services are to be provided would be shifted
from the government to the parents, who are in a better position
to know their children's needs as well as their strengths. Giv-
ing parents the authority and autonomy to decide that such
services are required to be provided in the children's home or in
an out-patient setting, would greatly enhance disabled chil-
dren's ability to be fully integrated into the life of their family,
school, and community.
Two cases from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals have a
similar potential for expanding disabled children's integration
into the community, through avoiding the Procrustean bed of
Medicaid Regulations. Detsel v. Sullivan135 and Skubel v. Sulli-
van 36 invalidated HHS regulations under the Medicaid Act, 37
which effectively confined disabled children to their homes as
the price of receiving nursing services under the Medicaid Act.
In Detsel, the Second Circuit held that the Secretary's interpre-
tation of the Medicaid regulations as denying coverage for pri-
vate duty nursing for a severely disabled child while she was
attending school, while covering identical services if they were
provided while the child was receiving private tutoring at
home, 38 was an unreasonable construction of congressional in-
tent in regard to Medicaid. 39 The court stressed that Congress
had "created the Medicaid program in part to assist states in
providing 'rehabilitation and other services to help [recipients]
attain or retain capability for independence or self-care."' 140 In
later amendments to the Medicaid Act, Congress was particu-
larly concerned about identifying and removing "'barriers that
prevent the provision of appropriate care in a home or commu-
nity setting to meet the special needs of technology-dependent
children."' 4' Congress was also concerned about "'recom-
mend[ing] changes in private and public health care programs
135. 895 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1990).
136. 113 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 1997).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a et seq. (1998).
138. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.80 (1997).
139. See Detsel, 895 F.2d at 63-64.
140. Id. at 62 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(19)).
141. Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 952D (1986) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1396a, note (1998))).
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so as to provide home and community-based alternatives to the
institutionalization of technology-based children." 142 While at
the time that the Medicaid Act was adopted, few, if any technol-
ogy dependent children could live at home, the court found that
that was no reason to enshrine an outdated medical perspective
in regulations. 143
In Skubel v. Sullivan,44 the Second Circuit applied similar
reasoning to Medicaid home health nursing regulations.145
These regulations required that home health nursing services
be provided only in a Medicaid recipient's home, and not in an
alternative setting, such as a school.' 46 The effect of these regu-
lations was to keep children out of public school and in their
homes. As in Detsel, the court in Skubel invalidated these regu-
lations as an unreasonable interpretation of the Medicaid
Act.147
Taken together, Detsel and Skubel demonstrate the impor-
tance of dedicated and persistent advocacy on the part of par-
ents of disabled children, to challenge arbitrary and rigid
interpretations of laws which are supposed to expand access to
health care services, but in fact frustrate efforts to provide these
services in a way which enhances disabled children's indepen-
dence and integration into the wider community. These cases
also transfer authority from the government to parents to de-
cide what is in a particular child's best interest.
Bragdon v. Abbott' 48 is a Supreme Court case with broad
implications for access to care for people with disabilities. The
specific issue in Bragdon was whether asymptomatic HIV infec-
tion was a disability within the meaning of the ADA, which out-
laws discriminatory treatment by places of public
accommodation, including hospitals and physicians' offices. 49
Sidney Abbott visited a dentist, Dr. Bragdon, for a routine fill-
ing of a cavity. 150 When Dr. Bragdon learned that Ms. Abbott
142. Id.
143. See Detsel, 895 F.2d at 65.
144. 113 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 1997).
145. See id. at 336-37.
146. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.70 (a)(1) (1997).
147. See Skubel, 113 F.3d at 337.
148. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
149. See id. at 2200.
150. See id. at 2201.
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was HIV positive, he refused to treat her, except in a hospital,
where the costs of treatment would be higher.'5 ' Abbott de-
clined, and instead sued Bragdon under Maine antidiscrimina-
tion law and the ADA. 152
The United States District Court for the District of
Maine, 53 the First Circuit Court of Appeals, 54 and the
Supreme Court 55 all agreed that asymptomatic HIV infection
was a physical impairment of the reproductive system that lim-
ited Ms. Abbott in a major life activity, to wit, reproduction.
The Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that the
only life activities which merit protection under the ADA are
those which have a "public, economic, or daily character."56
Since Ms. Abbott might reasonably choose not to risk infecting a
sexual partner or a fetus in utero, her reproductive capacity was
substantially limited. The Court found that the ADA definition
of disability does "not turn on personal choice." 15 7 As long as
Ms. Abbott's HIV infection substantially limited her ability to
reproduce, she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA.15
The Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for fur-
ther determination of whether her disability could be reason-
ably accommodated, in light of the significant risk of
transmission of HIV to Dr. Bragdon, which could not be elimi-
nated through the use of appropriate precautions. 159
The significance of Bragdon for children with disabilities is
profound. By holding that persons with disabilities must be af-
forded equal access to necessary medical care, the Supreme
Court effectuates the ADA's goal of ensuring full integration of
persons with disabilities into the mainstream of American life,
and potentially enhances parental authority to seek services for
their disabled children as they see fit. No longer can children
with HIV and other physical and mental disabilities be steered
routinely into specialty practices and clinics for those with par-
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995).
154. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1996).
155. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. 2196.
156. Id. at 2205.
157. Id. at 2206.
158. See id. at 2207.
159. See id. at 2213.
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ticular disabilities. 160 Instead, they must be given access to
treatment by mainstream providers, who must reasonably ac-
commodate a child's particular disability. 16' Necessary accom-
modations include wheelchair accessibility, sign language
interpretation, and the use of universal precautions to prevent
the spread of infectious diseases. 62
VIII. The Supplemental Security Income Program: Access to
Medicaid and Money
A crucial part of access to health care services for many
children with disabilities is their ability to receive cash assist-
ance and their eligibility for Medicaid services under the Sup-
plemental Security Income Program. 63 Under this program,
many children living at or below the poverty level can receive
cash for habilitative devices and services which they might not
be able to receive under a narrow definition of "medically neces-
sary," and which they could not otherwise afford. 64 In addition,
if children are determined to be disabled for the purposes of the
SSI program, they automatically become eligible to receive
Medicaid, which guarantees them access to medical care. 165
The landmark Supreme Court case of Sullivan v. Zebley166
provides critical background to the current controversy about
children's eligibility for SSI benefits cases. Brian Zebley, a dis-
160. Although, many times, children with disabilities will not seek care from
specialized providers who are experts at treating their particular illness or condi-
tion. However, it does suggest, particularly when viewed in conjunction with
Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995) and Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 U.S. 1952 (1998), that neither private health care pro-
fessionals nor state funded medical and habilitative service providers can insist
that disabled children visit only "high risk" practitioners or disability specialists, if
that is not what the children or their parents want.
161. Indeed, safeguards to secure access to health care for persons with disa-
bilities is mandated as part of the effort to move more indigent individuals into
Medicaid managed care plans. In New York, for example, health plans must
demonstrate how they will comply with the ADA as a condition of acceptance as a
Medicaid managed care provider. See New York State Dep't of Health, Guidelines
for Medicaid MCO Compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
Oct. 27, 1997.
162. See id.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (1998).
164. See Piori, supra note 11, at Al.
165. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
166. 493 U.S. 521 (1990).
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abled child, brought a class action suit against Louis Sullivan,
the Secretary of HHS, challenging Social Security regulations.
The regulations treated disabled adults and children differently
in terms of their ability to qualify for the SSI program. 167 The
Social Security Administration (SSA) required adult claimants
to show that they were unable to find substantial gainful em-
ployment due to a disability. 168 Adults were presumed disabled
if they suffered from a listed medical condition that was severe
enough to prevent them from obtaining substantial gainful em-
ployment. 169 In addition, adults who did not meet the enumer-
ated medical conditions could still be found disabled if an
individualized assessment showed that they were unable to do
their own past work or any other work available in the national
economy. 170 Approximately one quarter of all adults who quali-
fied for SSI benefits were found eligible under this individual-
ized review process. 171
In contrast, the SSI regulations for children with disabili-
ties failed to implement the statutory mandate that children
should be deemed disabled if they had a condition comparable
in severity to those that would prevent an adult from working,
since the regulations failed to provide a similar, individualized
opportunity for children to demonstrate a disability of "compa-
rable severity." 72 The Supreme Court struck down these regu-
lations as inconsistent with the statute, which in effect required
the Secretary of HHS to promulgate new regulations that pro-
vided for an individualized functional assessment of a child-
claimant's physical or mental impairments, and would evaluate
the impact of those impairments on the normal activities of a
child the claimant's age. 73
The new regulations required a child to show either a disa-
bility that met enumerated medical criteria, or, pursuant to an
167. See id. at 526.
168. See id. at 533.
169. Indeed, the list of medical conditions in the regulations was deliberately
designed to require a higher level of severity than mandated by the statute. The
regulations were so stringent that a person whose disabilities matched one of the
listed conditions would not be able to work at all. See id. at 532-33.
170. See id. at 534-35.
171. See Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 535, n. 15.
172. Id., 493 U.S. at 535-36.
173. See id. at 541.
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individualized functional assessment, that he or she was se-
verely impaired in one area of functioning, markedly impaired
in two areas of functioning, or moderately impaired in three ar-
eas of functioning. 174 In practice, these regulations resulted in a
huge increase in the number of children who were receiving SSI
and Medicaid because of their disabilities, and greatly in-
creased the costs of the SSI and Medicaid programs.
In the mid-1990's, Congress was besieged with media sto-
ries suggesting that some children were feigning disabilities, as
well as concerns that the regulations defined disability so
broadly that many children without serious disabilities were re-
ceiving benefits. 175 As part of a broad program of "welfare re-
form," Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.176 The Act eliminated
the parallel treatment of disabled children and adults.177
Rather than defining disability for children to encompass those
children whose impairments were of "comparable severity" to
adults whose disability precluded them from attaining substan-
tial gainful employment, the Act redefined disability to include
only those children whose mental or physical impairments re-
sulted in "marked and severe functional limitations," which
could be expected to last at least one year.178 In addition, the
Act mandated two major changes in implementing regulations
which also excluded many children who had previously been
classified as disabled. 179 The first was to rewrite the medical
criteria for mental and emotional disorders "to eliminate refer-
ences to maladaptive behavior in the domain of personal/behav-
ioral function,"180 which would preclude a finding of disability
for many children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
and other mental illnesses. The second change was even more
sweeping, as Congress eliminated individualized functional as-
174. Cf Supplemental Security Income; Determining Disability for a Child
Under Age 18; Interim Final Rules With Request for Comments, 62 Fed. Reg.
6408, 6409 (1997) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404 and 416).
175. See Doolittle, supra note 1, at 39.
176. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
177. See id. § 211(a)(4)(I).
178. Id. § 211(a)(4)(i).
179. See id. § 211(b)(1) and (2).
180. Id. § 211(b)(1).
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sessments for children who did not meet the listed medical con-
ditions,' 8 ' as had been required by Zebley. 82
These changes in the disability program for children were
expected to save nearly $5 billion in the SSI program over a six
year period, and $1.2 billion in federal and state Medicaid costs
over the same time frame.8 3 As a result of this drastic rewrit-
ing of federal disability law,84 it was estimated that as many as
315,000 children, many of whom were significantly impaired,
would either lose their current SSI and Medicaid benefits or be
declared ineligible to receive them if they applied. 8 5
In January 1997, the SSA began its redetermination pro-
cess, mailing letters to the parents of more than 270,000 chil-
dren informing them that the SSA would review their child's
eligibility for SSI.186 This review process focused on those chil-
dren who had been deemed eligible for SSI benefits based on an
individualized functional assessment, and began with children
whose disability had in part been expressed in maladaptive
behavior. 8 7
In the first few months of this review, more than half the
children whose eligibility was reconsidered had their benefits
denied. 88 Preliminary data showed wide variations among
states in the proportion of children removed from SSI rolls. 8 9
Many children's advocacy groups identified significant numbers
of severely disabled children who had been cut from the SSI
181. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, 211(b)(2).
182. See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990).
183. See Supplemental Security Income; Determining Disability for a Child
Under Age 18; Interim Final Rules With Request for Comments, 62 Fed. Reg.
6408, 6417 (1997) (to be codified at 20 CFR pts. 404 and 416).
184. Under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, the new definition of disability and new evaluation process for chil-
dren with disabilities was to apply to all claims filed on or after August 22, 1996,
and to all claims not yet finally adjudicated by that date, including all cases in
various stages of appeal. See 104 Pub. L. No. 193, 211(d), 110 Stat. 2105, 2190
(1996); see also Social Security Administration (SSA): Statement of Regulatory Pri-
orities," 62 Fed. Reg. 57189, 57193 (1997).
185. See Doolittle, supra note 1, at 35. However, the Balanced Budget Act of
1997 restored Medicaid entitlement for children who had previously received it by
virtue of their SSI eligibility. See id. at 40.
186. See id. at 39.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See Doolittle, supra note 1, at 37.
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rolls. When these cases received media attention, there was a
huge public and legislative outcry. In order to assist parents
whose children's eligibility for SSI would have to be redeter-
mined under the new law, in 1996 the American Bar Associa-
tion launched a pro bono advocacy program, the SSI Children's
Project, to connect families with lawyers who represent them in
the redetermination process. 190 The ABA has also provided an
important voice insisting that children receive a full and fair
hearing.191
In response, the Social Security Administration ordered a
"top to bottom" review of its procedures. In February 1998,
78,000 children (and their families), whose appeals had been de-
nied, were given notice of their ability to appeal these denials
and were specifically advised that they could petition for bene-
fits pending appeal. 192 Nonetheless, there continue to be dispar-
ities among the states in their rates of removing children from
SSI eligibility and many advocates for disabled children are still
concerned that children are improperly being denied SSI bene-
fits. 93 More than 147,000 children were cut from the SSI by
March of 1998, with 82% of them suffering from mental retarda-
tion or mental disorders. 94 Whether many of these children
will have their SSI benefits restored after their case is reheard
remains to be seen. The ultimate societal impact of leaving a
large number of mentally disabled children without necessary
treatment and supportive services is problematic, and the deci-
sion to remove these children from the SSI program, while fis-
cally attractive in the short-run, appears extremely unsound
over the long term.
190. See ABA Urges the Social Security Administration to Correct Continuing
Problems in SSI Cutoff for Disabled Children, (last modified Jan. 5, 1999) http:l!
www.abanet.org/media/news.html>.
191. See id.
192. See Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law (hereinafter Bazelon), Chil-
dren's SSI Update (visited June 22, 1998) <http://www.bazelon.org/ssiupdat.
html>.
193. See ABA Urges the Social Security Administration to Correct Continuing
Problems in SSI Cutoff for Disabled Children (visited July 24, 1998) <http:!!
www.abanet.org/media/news.html>.
194. See Bazelon, supra note 192.
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IX. Conclusion
Children with disabilities continue in an uphill battle to
gain access to necessary health care. Their parents' ability to
advocate effectively on their behalf is frequently constrained by
poverty, as well as by narrow and medically based criteria for
eligibility for supportive services. Further, in both chronic and
acute care settings, twenty-five years of judicial precedent, stat-
utes, and regulations have diminished the authority of all par-
ents to make treatment choices which they believe are in their
child's best interest, and denied parents a zone of autonomy in
which to make those choices. The right of parents to make med-
ical decisions for their children, a staple of our common law her-
itage, has become a vestigial illusion, with parents having the
authority to decide what is necessary treatment for their chil-
dren only if physicians and the federal government concur.
Although cases of medical neglect and abuse do occur, it is im-
portant that a parent not be charged with child abuse or being
an unfit parent simply because physicians disagree with the
parent's reasoning. As medicine and technology continue to ex-
pand opportunities for disabled children to reach their full po-
tential, it is critical that parents be given the authority and
autonomy to chart the course for their children that appears
wisest to them.
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